India: Indian federalism has always been contested

Indian federalism has always been contested by those who view with understandable scepticism the overarching constitutional powers that are given to the federal parliament and federal government in New Delhi. One political scientist described India’s constitution as being ‘federal in form but unitary in spirit’, and an extra critic described India as being only ‘quasi-federal’.

The time has come for India and Indians to reflect and review the federal idea, and to see how a better balance can be struck in centre–national relations.

The messy politics of Indian federalism was witnessed in October as the Indian cabinet hurriedly decided to approve the creation of a new national of Telangana, by dividing the national of Andhra Pradesh. Although the request for a separate national had been longstanding, there was political uproar from opponents of the partition.

Next sitting on the request for years, the cabinet took the decision for what seemed to be purely tactical electoral considerations dictated by the political interests of the ruling Indian National Congress party. The Telangana case reflects the ad hoc way that states have been created in India over the completed four decades, and is symptomatic of the lack of a federal balance.

A strong case can be made for additional states in India — where a country of over one billion people has only 29 states and a few federally governed territories — and for a further decentralisation of political power. That smaller states are easier to govern well, and that their residents are likely to be additional satisfied with public services, is intuitively obvious, although there are notable exceptions.

In India, however, almost each creation of a new national has been mired in controversy. In part, this is a function of three contradictions in Indian federalism vis-a-vis the redrawing of internal boundaries.

Initial, India is the majority diverse country part all the world’s federations, from presently on states have virtually no role to play in the creation of new states or, indeed, even in their own division, were that to happen. The Constitution of India has given supreme powers to the Indian parliament to create new states and change the borders of states by enlarging or decreasing their area. The view of the affected national is considered, but there is no obligation to act on it.

Second, there has always been tension over the criteria that should determine the creation of a new national. In the early years next independence, and even in the initial discussions within the States Reorganisation Committee (whose recommendations helped to create the initial 16 states in 1956), there was a view that states should be organised on the principle of administrative efficiency and next consideration of what would be best for their economic development. These principles were, however, sidestepped and a linguistic criterion that gave preference to a common language as being the basis for statehood was adopted.

But instead of settling issues, the reorganisation on the basis of language strengthened linguistic chauvinism. Be that as it may, this linguistic criterion continued until the creation of Telangana as the 29th national. The irony is that at the same time as the Telengana region was merged with the Telugu-speaking areas to create Andhra Pradesh in 1956, the criterion was a common language. But last month the decision to separate it from Andhra was ostensibly taken on grounds of history, a distinct identity and economic needs.

Third, because there is neither closure on the number of states, nor even a linguistic criterion presently, there is a perverse incentive for nearly each distinct linguistic, religious and ethnic identity to request statehood.

What is the way forward?

Clearly, a lot of Indian states would be better governed if additional manageable administrative units were carved out of them and fashioned into new states.

But what should the criterion be for the creation of new states?

The time is ripe for a ‘New’ States Reorganisation Commission to identify a set of criteria based on best practices across the world and consults deeply and widely within India to determine the basis upon which new states should be created.

In India the federal principle would work best if there was real devolution of power, not just to the states but as well to the villages, as Mohandas Gandhi had envisioned. So far, this has only been completed in a very small measure. Here, each national would become the facilitator of political decentralisation to the grassroots.

And while each national would from presently on enjoy autonomy within its administrative space to articulate macro policies aligned with the priorities of its residents, and to fasten their distinct cultural identity, there would be no economic firewalls between states.

An India that is economically integrated as one great free market and politically decentralised as millions of empowered villages in several facilitating states would be a formidable country, in each sense of the word.

Amitabh Mattoo is Director of the Australia India Institute and Professor of International Relations at the University of Melbourne.