Canada Environment Profile 2012

Climate change is one of the greatest global challenges of the 21st century, and increasing evidence of the present and anticipated impacts of climate change highlights the need for action. The 2007 Fourth  Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) confirmed that warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and human actions are changing the Earth’s climate and creating major disturbances for ecosystems, with major consequences for human development and well-being.4 While there have been some highly publicized criticisms of the integrity of some IPCC research, particularly research focused on regional impacts in developing countries, the core message remains unchanged and is supported by the vast majority of climate scientists.
There is increasing clarity about the growing risk of not preparing for the eventuality of a carbonconstrained future. Canada—for reasons related to the environment, economic vulnerabilities, investment risks, its competitive edge in the clean energy future, and its international reputation—has little choice but to develop a credible response to the threat of climate change.
Dealing with climate change will require cooperation, commitment, and action from all major emitters.
Over 100 world leaders, including Canada’s Prime Minister Stephen Harper, participated in the climate change negotiations at the 15th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP 15) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen in December 2009. While the Copenhagen Accord was far from the comprehensive agreement that many anticipated coming out of COP 15, it has the potential to develop a solid foundation and framework to help countries begin to respond effectively to climate change.
Significant elements for forging ahead were identified in the accord, including agreement to keep maximum global temperature increase to below two degrees Celsius; indications by major economies of targets (for developed countries) and nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs, for developing nations) to reduce emissions by 2020; the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, with agreement to mobilize US$30 billion for the period 2010-12; and agreement to act on technology transfer, adaptation, and reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (a program known as REDD). The process at Copenhagen, however, left much to be desired. The final deal was struck at a closed-door session of the United States with the four BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China). The accord
was then trumpeted, particularly by the United States, as a fait accompli. This left many other countries—from the European Union to the least developed countries (LDCs)—extremely frustrated at having to accept the accord as a de facto agreement.5 Canada did not appear upset at the turn of events because the core tenets  of the accord—all major economies are to begin mitigation actions, and developed countries are to simply transcribe their national targets without any international discussion or approval of those commitments—were
entirely consistent with the prime minister’s expectations. Prime Minister Harper called the Copenhagen Accord
a “comprehensive and realistic” agreement; and Environment Minister Jim Prentice stated, “This government
will act on the Copenhagen Accord because it is consistent with Canada’s stated position on climate change.”
The successful implementation of the Copenhagen Accord is arguably more critical for Canada than for any
other country, offering a potential opportunity to shift the focus from Canada’s not meeting its Kyoto obligations
to an interpretation where Canada plays a role as a constructive contributor to the new accord. Canada is
beginning to move in this direction, reflected in the June 2010 announcement of $400 million for its 2010
portion of the US$30 billion in fast-track financing promised under the Copenhagen Accord.  Canada’s actions on the Copenhagen Accord have to be balanced against the other, and primary, driver of
Canadian federal policy on climate change: namely, US federally legislated actions on climate change. Canada
has decided that its climate change response will be closely linked to that of the United States; the decision is
reflected in Canada’s following the US lead on implementing fuel efficiency standards for passenger vehicles and
light trucks; collaborating with the United States to develop regulations to reduce emissions from heavy-duty
vehicles; and aligning any future cap-and-trade regulations with the system put in place in the United States.
Canada has moved independently on the regulation of coal-fired electricity generation and renewable content
for gasoline and diesel fuel. But Canada has yet to elaborate on how it will meet its Copenhagen target of a
17-percent reduction from 2005 levels by 2020 (roughly equal to the 1990 level); and the United States has yet
to legislate or implement any other regulations on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
Canada could face challenges in making the case that the country is moving in a clean energy direction if it
falls short on climate change action. The world is heading in a very significant clean energy direction, driven not
just by climate change but by energy security, trade relationships, investments, and jobs. Climate change is only
one element of an integrated clean energy strategy, but an important one for those concerned about Canada’s
profile—such as the United States, which accounts for 99 percent of Canadian energy exports.
Climate change as a pre-eminent international policy issue may be on the wane. Indications of this decline
include the relative debacle at Copenhagen; the new pieces of evidence on the work of the IPCC that appear
to strengthen the contention that the science on climate change is far from clear;8 and the apparent lack of
legislative will in the United States to introduce any regulatory or fiscal measures that send a significant carbon
price signal. The world may soon find itself in a situation similar to that of the Doha Development Round of trade
negotiations under the World Trade Organization (WTO), where countries meet sporadically but are unable to
break through critical logjams. Yet climate change remains a prominent policy issue; and Canada’s positions on
climate change impact its actions in other foreign policy spheres, just as foreign policy can influence climate
change decisions.
Without strong action in Canada and other developed countries to demonstrate the feasibility of delinking
GHG emissions growth from economic activity, developing countries will never be persuaded to follow suit. There
is an increasing realization in the international community that making this case requires positioning climate
change in a broader policy context. The climate change negotiations do not take place in isolation from other
developments on the global agenda, and many of the decisions critical for an effective transition to a low-carbon
economy will take place outside the climate policy community. Countries’ actions in the area of climate change
can have impacts on their profile and influence in other areas of foreign policy.
An integrated approach to climate change and foreign policy in Canada has the potential to improve
prospects for more effective efforts to address climate change and strengthen foreign policy. This paper examines
the Canadian climate change and foreign policy dynamic, analyzing strengths and failures of existing policy and
prospects for new policy in the areas of federal-provincial relations, international diplomacy, energy security
and trade, multilateral trade, international peace and security, and development cooperation. Linkages and
intersections that exist or might develop between climate change policy and foreign policy are explored, and
recommendations are put forward.
The Canadian Policy Context
Despite widespread acceptance that human activities are changing the climate, global GHG emissions are
not abating. UNFCCC data indicate that aggregate GHG emissions (excluding land use, land-use change, and
forestry) in Annex I parties declined by 3.9 percent from 1990 to 2007, but much of the reduction was due to
the economic collapse of Communist regimes in central and eastern Europe. In other Annex I countries, which are predominantly members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), emissions
increased by 11.2 percent from 1990 to 2007. Canada’s emissions increased by 26 percent from 1990 to 2007.9
GHG emissions are also increasing in developing nations. Over half of GHG emissions in 2008 were
accounted for by economic activities in developing countries; and this share is projected to grow significantly if
no new policies and measures are implemented to limit the increase.10 Much of this growth is expected to occur
in a few major developing economies, notably China, India, Brazil, South Korea, Indonesia, and Mexico.11
Climate change impacts will affect all countries, and the poor, primarily but by no means exclusively in LDCs,
will be disproportionately affected.12 The poor are the most vulnerable and least able to adapt to the impacts of
climate change because of their reliance on local ecological resources, coupled with existing stresses on health
and well-being and limited financial, institutional, and human resources. The areas of the world least responsible
for contributing to GHG emissions are the ones that stand to be the most immediately and significantly impacted
by climate change.
Canada is one of the largest GHG emitters in the world, ranking fourth in per capita carbon dioxide
emissions and total emissions among OECD countries, based on 2007 data from the International Energy Agency
(IEA).13 Canada’s GHG emissions reached 747 megatonnes in 2007, 26.2 percent above 1990 levels and 33.8
percent above its Kyoto target.14 A growing population and economy, thriving energy and natural resource sectors
mostly geared for export markets, weather, consumption patterns and consumer preferences, and urban sprawl
all contribute to Canada’s high GHG emissions.
Climate change is often characterized as an issue of industrial emissions, but industry is just one of the major
factors. Sixty-five percent of Canada’s emissions comes from sectors other than the large final emitters—in the
area of consumer behaviour and activities, such as transportation.15 Industry in Canada, for the most part, equals
its global peers in terms of energy efficiency and intensity of use in its operations.16 Improvements in production
processes in heavy industry and manufacturing as well as energy efficiency in the residential sector resulted in
decreased emissions from these sectors between 1990 and 2007. Canada has continually lowered its emissions
relative to GDP through technological and operational changes.
Emissions increases in Canada have been largest in the energy and transportation sectors, largely because
of increased fossil fuel production and a greater number of motor vehicles on the road. In 2007, approximately
82 percent of Canada’s emissions was in the energy sector, with transportation (a subsector in this sector)
accounting for 27 percent of emissions.17
Emissions from fossil fuel industries experienced a 44-percent growth from 1990 to 2007, driven by an
increase in total production of oil and gas (a 68-percent increase over 1990 levels).18 Drivers of this growth
include elevated demand, particularly in the United States, and a shift from conventional to non-conventional
sources of energy, such as the oil sands and coal-bed methane. Petroleum extraction from the oil sands is
expected to steadily increase, with 2015 production projected to be almost double that of 2005.19 This will put strong upward pressure on emissions. The oil sands are an exceptionally carbon-intensive means of extracting oil
and are used exclusively for meeting vehicular transportation needs in North America.
Emissions from the transportation sector increased by 38 percent from 1990 to 2007. Population has
increased, kilometres driven per capita have increased, and a consumer preference for larger, less efficient
vehicles in recent years has minimized the impact of increases in passenger vehicle efficiency over this period.20
As well, freight transport emissions are up because most freight movement is undertaken using heavy-duty trucks,
the most energy- and emissions-intensive mode of freight transport.21
Drivers of high GHG emissions in Canada include consumption patterns, an urban planning model
characterized by sprawl, and mass transit systems that are of standards lower than those of most other OECD
countries. The result is that Canada (like the United States) is among the largest consumers of energy on a per
capita basis in the world, with a rate approximately twice the per capita energy consumption of other OECD
countries in the European Union (EU) and 15 times the per-person energy use of India.22
Consumption practices have played a critical role in determining the carbon profile of industry,
transportation, and personal energy use. A historic abundance of cheap, domestic energy has led to policies,
lifestyles, and business models that largely do not emphasize energy conservation as a necessity. In Manitoba,
to give but one example, where the province has the luxury of a renewable energy source, the Crown utility has
traditionally used this advantage to maintain low industrial electricity rates and an inverse rate structure that
makes power cheaper as consumption increases, which discourages conservation.23 Since 2008, Manitoba Hydro
has been working to introduce an energy-intensive industrial rate in order to address the consumption issue. An
appropriate rate proposal has not yet been approved for implementation by the provincial utilities regulator.
While governments continue to make strides with legislation and consumer awareness initiatives, reductions
in Canadian energy consumption will rely on behavioural shifts at the individual level. This will be a difficult
transition. Most Canadians say they care deeply about the environment,24 yet they appear unaware of the impact
of the prevalent North American lifestyle on the global environment. This lifestyle is based on a development
model of urban sprawl, individual vehicle ownership, and high consumer demand, with an industrial infrastructure
built to support that model. High GHG emissions are a societal problem that requires transformational changes
in lifestyles to bring about reduced energy consumption.
There is no easy fix, and Canada will continue to be seriously challenged to deliver on international
expectations to significantly reduce GHG emissions. The mere fact that the federal government has been unable
to put in place a regulatory framework to address GHG emissions speaks volumes about the enormity of the
domestic challenge in Canada.
Climate Change Policy
In Canada, jurisdiction is shared and overlapped to a great extent in allocating roles and responsibilities on
environment, energy, natural resources, and trade and investment policies—all areas related to climate change
policy. Ottawa has the constitutional lead on negotiating a new international climate change agreement; but in
political terms, moving ahead on this issue, which is fundamentally about energy and use of natural resources,
requires provincial collaboration and partnership.  Federal Climate Change Policy
In February 2010, Environment Minister Jim Prentice announced Canada’s new GHG reduction target:
17-percent reductions by 2020, from a 2005 base year. This new target is less demanding than the previous
target of 20-percent reductions, and it precisely matches that of the United States. This is consistent with the
government’s desire to harmonize Canada’s climate change strategy with that of its largest trading partner.
Minister Prentice also announced that Canada is not prepared to implement a cap-and-trade system or
significant climate change regulations in the absence of similar action in the United States. The government has
proposed regulations for coal-fired electricity generation and renewable content in gasoline and diesel fuels,
and will sustain programs that focus on technology and innovation relating to climate change, including biofuels
and bioproduct development, energy efficiency, and transportation initiatives, and will continue to support
provincial projects.25
There is widespread skepticism about Canada’s ability to meet the emissions reduction target by 2020, not
least because the government has no plan.26 Changing the government’s approach to climate change is difficult,
and the first step is determining how it chooses to frame the issue. A senior government official described the
climate change issue as akin to “walking on glass”—whatever step you take, you bleed (politically); so it is best
to take as few and as small steps as possible.27 For example, the government got little, if any, recognition for
proposed actions in its 2008 document Turning the Corner: An Action Plan to Reduce Greenhouse Gases and Air
Pollution, even though many industries argued that it set out a challenging target that would be tough to meet.28
The government’s response is understandable and unfortunate. Linking the Canadian response to action in the
United States gets the same critical response from environmental groups as developing climate policy (but very
little response from others, including voters).
As already noted, the world is beginning to head in a clean energy direction, driven by a wide range of
considerations, including climate change, energy security, trade relationships, investments, and jobs. In that
context, addressing climate change becomes a different animal. Climate change is one of a range of elements
making the case for an integrated clean energy future, of which Canada needs to be at the forefront.
Provincial Climate Change Policy
All provinces and territories have, at least at some level, climate change initiatives in place. Detailed in appendix
1, many of these initiatives focus on energy conservation and renewable energy, consistent with the 2007 Council
of the Federation agreement to reduce GHG emissions within provincial and territorial jurisdictions.29 The extent
and schedule of climate change measures vary, representing a wide range of views on how actively a strong
mitigation regime should be pursued within Canada. These views reflect differences in reliance on fossil fuels,
difficulties in reducing emissions, and projected economic growth and fiscal conditions.
Legislation in British Columbia and Manitoba includes climate change targets, aiming for GHG reductions in
British Columbia of 33 percent by 2020 from 2007 levels, and a 6-percent reduction as soon as 2012 from 1990
levels in Manitoba. Quebec has a GHG reduction target of 20 percent by 2020 from 1990 levels; and British
Columbia and Quebec have adopted carbon taxes. Ontario has feed-in tariffs for renewable energy and plans for
community-based power support and development. Alberta was the first province to regulate its large emitters,
in July 2007, using an intensity-based system that calls for 12-percent emissions reductions from large facilities.
Alberta has launched a $2-billion fund for carbon capture and storage (CCS), and Saskatchewan has expressed
a strong interest in CCS. Saskatchewan introduced legislation in 2009 that will allow the province to develop intensity-based targets, regulate emitters, and establish a climate change fund. Nova Scotia has established
absolute caps on its electricity sector, and Newfoundland and Labrador is forming a secretariat on climate change
that will operate out of the premier’s office and that is expected to roll out a provincial implementation plan
over the next year. The territories and Prince Edward Island (and Nova Scotia to a certain extent) emphasize
adaptation in their plans.
A number of provinces are developing cap-and-trade systems, although the details are far from being
sorted out. Quebec (in June 2009) and British Columbia (in May 2008) adopted legislation that authorizes
the government to implement a cap-and-trade system for GHGs in North America. In May 2009, the Ontario
government introduced enabling legislation that, if passed, would allow the implementation of a cap-andtrade
system. Manitoba is committed to passing similar legislation in the near future. The details of provincial
legislation are expected to be worked out in cooperation with partners in the Western Climate Initiative (WCI),
a collaborative venture of some US states and Canadian provinces that aims to reduce GHG emissions, including
through a cap-and-trade system (see page 18 for more details).
An open question is how relatively moderate domestic targets (whether at the provincial or federal level)
can credibly address the growing international concern about the scientific estimates. The IPCC indicates that
preventing dangerous climate change will require, at the very least, halving global emissions by 2050 from 1990
levels, with developed countries reducing their emissions by at least 80 percent by mid-century.30
Foreign Policy
The federal government has constitutional authority for foreign policy and trade, and it negotiates and ratifies
international treaties. Provinces have a high level of freedom to operate internationally; most provinces have a
ministry responsible for international relations.
Federal Foreign Policy
Canada’s foreign policy is intrinsically linked to that of the United States, and this relationship influences much
of Canada’s foreign policy decision-making. Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (or the Department
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, DFAIT) notes that Canada and the United States are “partners
for security, in economic growth, for energy security, for a smart border and on environmental issues.”31 The
trade relationship with the United States dwarfs all other considerations and frames other issues, including
cooperation on environmental and energy affairs.
Foreign relations with other countries tend to be secondary to Canada’s relations with the United States.
Apart from the United States, priorities of DFAIT include the following:
• Pursuing economic opportunity for Canada, with a focus on growing and emerging markets such
as China and India. Canada has identified 13 world markets where the potential for economic growth
is greatest.32
• The Americas, including the trade opportunities with target markets and contributions to a more
democratic, prosperous, and secure hemisphere that creates stability and opportunity for its citizens.
• Afghanistan, including in the context of neighbouring countries.

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is the main delivery agent of public development
assistance. The federal government announced in February 2009 that it was focusing its aid program on three
new development priorities—food security, sustainable economic growth, and children and youth—and on 20
focus countries (reducing the number of African-concentration countries from 14 to seven). In October 2008, the
government announced $100 million in funding for international climate change adaptation to assist developing
countries that are especially vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. This funding is delivered
through the World Bank, thus weakening Canada’s direct influence on the use of the funds and hurting its profile
as a champion of a few discrete, but well respected, bilateral projects.
Canada hosted the G8 and G20 summits in June 2010. The G8 and G20 committed to work toward a
successful outcome at the UNFCCC meetings to be held in Cancun in December 2010, and those countries that
had associated with the Copenhagen Accord reaffirmed their commitment to its implementation and called on
other countries to support the accord. The G8 reiterated its goal of developed countries achieving at least an
80-percent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, and called on the major emerging economies to
undertake quantifiable actions to reduce emissions. G8 nations noted that they are putting in place fast-start
financial contributions to help developing countries.34 Prior to the summits, Canada made two climate-changerelated
announcements: $400 million for climate change efforts in the poorest and most vulnerable countries,
delivering on its commitment under the Copenhagen Accord; and the development of new regulations for
coal-fired electricity generation.35
Provincial Foreign Policy
Many Canadian provinces are active in the field of foreign policy. (See appendix 2 for a list of provinces’ trade
offices and participation in international agreements.) Quebec is the most independent and active, having a
bilateral assistance program and delegations or trade offices in many countries. Quebec has a permanent
representative in Canada’s mission to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO); and Quebec and New Brunswick are full participating governments in the Francophonie.
While the vast majority of provincial foreign policy and trade relations are focused on the United States,
some provinces including Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario have developed international trade, marketing,
and investment offices in several countries. Quebec has the most formal and extensive foreign presence with
seven general delegations, five delegations, ten bureaus, and four trade offices across the continents of Asia,
Europe, and North and South America. Alberta has developed an extensive campaign to strengthen Alberta-US
relations and reinforce the province’s commitment to environmentally sustainable development of the oil sands.
Three provinces provided international development assistance in 2007-08: Quebec ($47.4 million),
Manitoba ($0.45 million), and Alberta ($1.68 million). This is a very small amount when compared with CIDA’s
spending of $3.126 billion in 2007-08.36
As with federal foreign policy, provincial external initiatives, particularly when it comes to trade and energy,
are focused on opportunities in the United States. An example is the premiers’ mission to Washington in February
2010, when eight provincial leaders met with the National Governors Association to discuss trade and border
issues, as well as energy and the environment.37 Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
entered into force in 1994, there has been a clear trend of trade flows, including energy, of an increasingly
“north to south” character.38 Canada’s large geography and related transportation costs often deter east-west
integration, in favour of more viable north-south trade options. For instance, despite decades of talks about selling hydro power to Ontario, Manitoba Hydro has found it easier to sell to customers in Minnesota and
Wisconsin, completing large sales to both in recent years.39 Plans for an east-west power grid remain on the
drawing board in Canada.
Intersections between Climate Change and Foreign Policy
Climate change policy and foreign policy are increasingly intertwined in Canada. Canada is a signatory to the
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, and some provinces are engaged with American states in efforts to reduce
GHG emissions.
Federal Level
At the federal level, the most prominent and apparent forum for connection between climate change and foreign
policy is the UNFCCC negotiations. In January 2010, the Canadian government submitted its emissions reduction
target of 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020 to the UNFCCC, consistent with the terms of the Copenhagen
Accord. The accord was the substantive outcome of the climate change conference held in December 2009. The
accord does not impose binding emissions targets or set a deadline for forming an internationally binding treaty,
but progress was made in many areas, including these main points:
• The objective of keeping maximum global temperature increase to below two degrees Celsius.
• A commitment to list developed countries’ emissions reduction targets and developing countries’
mitigation actions for 2020 (countries were to submit targets and actions to the secretariat of the
UNFCCC by January 31, 2010).
• Developed countries’ commitment to a goal of jointly mobilizing US$100 billion annually by 2020
from both public and private sources, and a collective commitment to provide “new and additional,
predictable and adequate funding” amounting to US$30 billion for the period 2010-12 with a
balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation.
• Explicit acknowledgement to act on REDD, including the immediate establishment of a REDD-plus
mechanism.
• Action and cooperation on adaptation, particularly in LDCs, small island developing states (SIDS),
and Africa.
• Establishment of technology mechanisms to accelerate technology development and transfer.40
Many anticipated a more comprehensive agreement out of COP 15, but the Copenhagen Accord has the potential
to be a foundation and framework for effectively climate change action. As of March 2010, quantified emissions
targets for 2020 had been submitted by 14 Annex I countries and the European Union and its 27 member states;
and NAMAs had been submitted by 35 non-Annex I parties, with a number of these countries noting their need
for international support.
The process of negotiating the Copenhagen Accord, however, left much to be desired. The United States with
the four BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) reached the final deal at a closed-door session,
which left many other countries—from the European Union to the least developed countries (LDCs)—extremely
frustrated at having to accept the accord with no input to its development.41 Canada appeared to accept the main
principles of the accord—all major economies are to begin mitigation actions, and developed countries are to simply transcribe their national targets without any international discussion or approval of those commitments—
as being entirely consistent with the government’s position on climate change. The Canadian government has
stated that it will work to implement the Copenhagen Accord and has announced a $400-million contribution
for international climate change for 2010-11. The government supports the UNFCCC negotiations for a legally
binding post-2012 climate change agreement, and has been more proactive in the negotiations, especially in the
areas of REDD and agriculture.
The future of the Copenhagen Accord is far from assured, and indications of how the accord will be
implemented will be critical over 2010 to ensure a viable international climate change regime remains in place.
Canada should have a high stake in ensuring that the accord has legs, because it offers an opportunity for Canada
to be a constructive contributor, shifting the focus from Canada’s inability to meet its Kyoto target. Canada is the
only country with an international binding target under the protocol that has indicated it does not intend to meet
its obligations, and Canada is not likely to choose a Kyoto “path” that does not include the United States.
Canada can achieve only a limited amount in the negotiations if it does not have a credible plan that lays
out how it will meet its target of a 17-percent reduction by 2020. This is particularly so in regard to the issue
of enhancing developing countries’ engagement in reducing their GHG emissions. Major developing economies
can hardly be expected to agree to undertake significant emissions reduction actions when leading developed
countries, like Canada, do not have a regulatory framework in place and have experienced significant emissions
growth. In other words, until such time that countries like Canada are able to demonstrate that emissions can be
delinked from economic growth, developing countries are unlikely to agree to consider mitigation targets.
The expectation of leadership from developed countries also stems from the concept of historic emissions.
GHGs are cumulative, and industrialized countries are responsible for approximately three-quarters of GHGs in
the atmosphere. Developed countries, including Canada, need to demonstrate a willingness and ability to reduce
emissions before insisting that developing countries take on similar commitments.
Long before the current government, other Canadian governments have not always made good choices in
the climate change negotiations. Examples include proposing a Kyoto Protocol target more stringent than had
been agreed to by federal and provincial energy and environment ministers. Perhaps even more damaging was
Canada’s decision, after the Bush administration made it clear that it would not be ratifying the protocol, to
ratify Kyoto and then work to weaken the international regime (through sinks accounting regimes and, most
infamously, by attempting to obtain “credits” for green energy exports to a country that was not a party to
the protocol). Many in the international community believe that Canada is trying to undermine progress on a
post-2012 international agreement by refusing to meet its Kyoto targets, while offering no explanation of how
it will deal with the penalties under the Kyoto Protocol. Of course, there is only so much a mid-level power like
Canada can achieve. Much of the criticism that Canada is “sabotaging” the negotiations is inaccurate—Canada
does not have the weight to do so.
Provincial Level
The delay in implementation of federal emissions regulation in Canada has led most provinces to take action
themselves, often engaging US counterparts directly or acting to protect their own interests in the face of future
regulations that could affect international trade. The provincial responses to the intersection of climate change
and foreign policy can be broken down roughly into three groups.
The first group of provinces are linked by their shared membership in the WCI. These provinces—British
Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec—have strengthened their ties with American states through climate
change initiatives, including working toward the establishment of a cap-and-trade system. These provinces
have positioned themselves to address potential barriers to trade by working with trade partners on climate
change policy.

Launched in 2007, the WCI includes the four Canadian provinces mentioned above and seven American
states, with two provinces (Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia), seven American states, and six Mexican states
participating as observers.42 In 2007, the four member provinces represented roughly 79 percent of the
population, 76 percent of national GDP, and 53 percent of GHG emissions in Canada.43 The WCI collaboration
aims to cut emissions to 15 percent below 2005 levels by 2020 and includes the development of a regional
cap-and-trade system to help attain that goal. In addition to the WCI target, each of the provincial members has
set more stringent unilateral targets that are outlined in appendix 1.
Manitoba is a member of and Ontario an observer to the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord
(MGGRA), another regional emissions reduction and cap-and-trade collaboration of states and provinces. The
MGGRA focuses on the needs of the industry-intensive Midwest region of North America. Ontario and Quebec
are observers to the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a cap-and-trade initiative of northeastern and
mid-Atlantic American states.
The second group—representing 14 percent of Canada’s population, 17 percent of GDP, and 43 percent
of GHG emissions in 2007—is Alberta and Saskatchewan.44 Foreign policy (the protection of trade relations
with the United States) is the driver of climate policy in Alberta, which has taken a unilateral but extensive
and active approach in response to climate change. Alberta’s motivation to act early and decisively is the need
to protect trade interests for the oil sands, particularly with the United States, which has expressed concern
about the carbon intensity of the Alberta oil industry. In response to internal and external economic and
environmental concerns, Alberta has developed a climate change approach that includes regulation of large
emitters and a $2-billion fund to support the development and deployment of CCS technology. The regulations
for large emitters include an emissions intensity target (i.e., GHG emitted per unit of economic output) that can
be met through operational improvements, the purchase of offsets, or payments to a Technology Fund (at $15/
tonne of GHG). Alberta has an international lobbying campaign in the United States geared at protecting oil
exports. Saskatchewan is still developing its climate change plan, with enabling legislation introduced but no firm
regulations in place. Its investment in the oil industry and early policy signals (including support of federal GHG
targets) indicate that the province will likely move in a policy direction similar to Alberta’s. Saskatchewan has a
2009 memorandum of understanding with Montana to demonstrate and test large-scale post-combustion CCS.
The remaining, less active provinces make up the third group. Nova Scotia is an observer to the WCI
process and has introduced a cap on emissions for its electricity sector. New Brunswick is an observer to
RGGI. Newfoundland and Labrador and Prince Edward Island have not participated in any regional initiatives,
but Newfoundland and Labrador does have a particular interest in fossil fuel regulations due to offshore oil
development and is developing its climate change policy. While these provinces have not been as active as others,
that is likely to change over the next few years, with increasing interest and engagement emanating from the
Atlantic region.
The provinces are interested in and follow the UNFCCC negotiations, with a number sending representatives
to the multilateral discussions as members of the official Canadian delegation. The premiers of Manitoba, Nova
Scotia, and Quebec attended COP 15 in Copenhagen.

Linkages between Climate Change and Foreign Policy:
Critical Areas
The milieu of foreign relations is dynamic, offering opportunities for actions that can meet foreign policy
objectives and deepen commitments to meet the global threat of climate change. Six specific areas where foreign
policy and climate change intersect in significant ways are explored: federal-provincial relations; international
relations and diplomacy; energy security and trade; multilateral trade and investment; international peace and
security issues; and development cooperation.
Federal-Provincial Relations
Linkages with Climate Change
Federal-provincial relations are a critical variable in the context of Canadian climate change policy and foreign
policy. The overlapping jurisdictions between federal and provincial fields of powers often, but not always, present
constraints in achieving integration between climate change and foreign policy objectives. Sometimes these
shared jurisdictions can loosen constraints, an example being the provincially driven cross-border WCI and the RGGI.
Climate change demonstrates the potential for conflict between these levels of government in policy (which
is not always bad) and implementation. A complication is the different climate change strategies and priorities
of provinces, which are based on particular socio-economic circumstances that are generally defined by natural
resources. Hydro-powered provinces like Manitoba and Quebec have different perspectives than fossil fuel
producers like Alberta and Saskatchewan (in climate change, where you stand depends on where you sit). This
variety has led to differing, and at times conflicting, approaches to addressing climate change and fostering trade
among the provinces, with a particular tension between the Alberta-Saskatchewan group and the other provinces.
Some suggest that the current federal and Alberta governments philosophically agree on climate change; but the
federal government has to respond to other regional sensitivities and perspectives, particularly those of Ontario
and Quebec. For these reasons, climate change can exacerbate an already sensitive federal-provincial dynamic.
The federal-provincial dynamic in regard to climate change policy creation has changed from a top-down
to a bottom-up approach. At the time of the development of the Kyoto Protocol, the federal government took
the lead in addressing climate change and tried to get provinces on side, yet some provinces were left out of the
policy development loop.45 The adoption of the national target for GHG emissions reductions by the Chrétien
government at COP 3 in 1997 demonstrated this approach. Despite agreeing to a 1990 emissions stabilization
target with the provinces in November 1997, at the December negotiations Prime Minister Jean Chrétien
unilaterally upped that target to emissions reductions of 3 percent below 1990 levels.46 This infuriated the
provinces, which accused the federal government of bad faith in the negotiations.
Twelve years later the roles have changed. British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec have decided
to take on the climate change issue and are developing long-term strategies to cut GHG emissions, including
targets, timetables, regulations, and systems for pricing carbon in coordination with influential American states.
These actions will help address climate change, help ensure their provincial interests are accounted for at early
stages of policy development, and, perhaps more importantly, help prepare provincial economies for the carbonconstrained
economy of the 21st century. Even Alberta is preparing for this future, having enacted a regulatory
package for large emitters. Whether born of a desire to protect their economic interests, to pick up the slack
for lack of regulation at the federal level, or to take advantage of regional clean energy and green investment
opportunities, a bottom-up approach to climate change policy is evident in Canada in 2010. The provinces are
pressuring the federal government and trying to define overall policy.

The advanced policy positions of the provinces mean that it will be difficult for the federal government to
impose national regulations that push provinces in different directions. The federal government has adopted
a wait-and-see approach to its regulatory framework, opting to have a system that is in lockstep with the US
system—essentially being a policy taker. Alberta has adopted an intensity-based approach, different than the
absolute cap on emissions present in the WCI provinces and proposed in bills by the US government. If the
federal government abandons its proposed intensity-based system for an absolute system, Alberta—the first
regulator of large emitters—will be the only jurisdiction with an intensity-based approach, and could use this
position to seek allowances for the oil sands in the development of a national cap-and-trade system.
Strengths, Failures, and Prospects for Policy
Unfortunately for Canada, the situation in the provinces is not widely known in international climate change
discussions. Most countries in the UNFCCC negotiations look to the federal government in order to assess the
entire national situation. Canada should promote provincial-level successes to demonstrate positive action on
climate change, helping to counter Canada’s reputation as doing nothing on climate change. That said, Canada
still requires a credible, detailed climate change plan. As already mentioned, the government’s scope and ability
to influence the international negotiations, including the implementation of the Copenhagen Agreement, will be
significantly curtailed if a comprehensive plan for meeting Canada’s 2020 target is not rolled out over 2010.
Alberta has increasing motivation, i.e., protection of its international trade relations, to ensure its policies
on climate change are sound (it is noteworthy that Alberta’s counter-lobbying in the United States emphasizes
the energy security provided by the oil sands). Further, programs at the state level in the United States, such as
the California fuel efficiency standards, can have a huge impact on the sources of these fossil fuels, hindering
the export capabilities of jurisdictions like Alberta. CCS will be an increasingly important technology for the
province. That said, there is also a growing awareness of the limitations of CCS in addressing GHG issues arising
from the oil sands. Many in situ activities, for example, do not lend themselves to CCS, at least at an affordable
price. These difficulties necessitate a broader carbon management approach in Alberta that includes robust
participation in global and regional carbon markets as a short-term bridging strategy to help move to a different
technology future.
There are also opportunities to broaden climate change and clean energy discussions. While there are
legitimate concerns about the potential impact of Canadian and American climate change policy on oil sand
exporters, it is important to emphasize clean energy. Canada is a leader in the export of hydro, natural gas,
and uranium, all cleaner energy sources than coal and oil sands. Canada needs to accentuate the positive in its
climate and clean energy discussions.
With no strong national framework to address climate change or energy, it should not be a surprise that
provinces have decided to act independently on these issues. A Canadian dialogue would begin to more effectively
address climate change issues in Canada, including discussions on how Canada can meet its international target
and what Canada can offer in the way of technology transfer and capacity building. Such a dialogue could
emphasize each province doing their fair share, and development of a Canadian market for carbon credits that
is compatible with a US approach and perhaps with existing cross-border initiatives. The transformational
shift in energy systems required to address climate change will require a Canadian strategy, and a federalprovincial
energy dialogue would also be useful given the close linkages between energy and climate change. The
development of a comprehensive strategy must also engage stakeholders.
A Canadian strategy must be proactive, not reactive. Climate change is a long-term issue, with national
policies and targets for emissions reductions set out until the middle of the century. A long-term Canadian climate
change strategy must go hand-in-hand with a long-term Canadian energy strategy with proactive goals and
policies that address growing consumer concerns about energy security, trade protectionism, and environmental
threats. Without a coherent approach to energy development, meeting our climate change goals is virtually Recommendations
• Canada requires a credible, detailed domestic clean energy and climate change plan that includes
coordination of federal, provincial, and territorial GHG emissions reduction policies.
• A First Ministers’ Meeting should be called to address Canadian energy policy, climate change, and
Canada’s profile in the North American energy picture.
• Provincial achievements in the area of climate change could